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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMEiRALTY-DocmINE oF UNSEAWORTHINESS OF SHIPOWNER'S VESSEL
-SHIPOWNqER HELD STRICTLY LIABLE TO LoNGsHoRE MN-Deffes v. Fed-
eral Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1966)-Ernest 0. Deffes, a
longshoreman employed by Continental Grain Company, was injured in the
process of unloading grain from a barge owned by Federal Barge Lines,
Inc., and chartered by Gulf-Canal Lines, Inc. After receiving compensation
from Continental,1 plaintiff sought recovery against Federal and Gulf based
on the doctrine of unseaworthiness under the provisions of the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.2
The injury resulted from an alleged defect in a marine leg, a conveyor
belt to which buckets are attached. This mechanical elevator device is in-
troduced through the open hatch and rests on the bottom of the barge.
Plantiff claimed that a metal fragment from a worn bucket broke off and hit
him in the eye. The fact that the marine leg was the property of Continen-
tal and under its exclusive control was not disputed.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
held that a defect in the marine leg would not cause the barge to be unsea-
worthy 3 This decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit which ruled that the defective marine leg used in un-
loading made the barge unseaworthy.4
An historical investigation of the cases allowing recovery by a long-
shoreman against a shipowner under the theory of unseaworthiness is
helpful in illustrating this remedy which is available to longshoremen in
addition to the right of action under the Act.
The right to recovery by a longshoreman against a shipowner for the
unseaworthy condition of a vessel has been uniformly recognized since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.5
1 It should be noted at this point that a longshoreman is limited to a single recov-
ery for any element of damage and if recovery from a suit against a third party is given
for the same element as recovered under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, he must reimburse his employer to the extent of the amount which
his employer has paid. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964), 44 Stat. 1440-41 (1927).
2 33 U.S.C. § 907-09 (1964), 44 Stat. 1427-30 (1927), [hereinafter cited as Act].
3 Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. La. 1964). The district
court, citing McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 368 US. 913 (1961), demonstrated its support of the theory that there should
be no recovery under the doctrine of unseaworthiness when the equipment causing the
injury was not equipment traditionally found aboard and used in unloading operations.
4 Deffes v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 361 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1966). Relying heavily
on the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sie-
racki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), Judge Thornberry, in speaking for the court, argued that the
important question was whether the plaintiff was performing traditional seaman's work.
G 328 U.S. 85 (1946). After discussing the superior ability of the shipowner to bear
the financial burden of the injury, the court said, "Historically the work of loading and
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In that case, recovery was granted to a longshoreman who, while unloading
a ship, was injured due to the breaking of a shackle supporting a ten ton boom
owned by the stevedore. The Court has also held that a shipowner's liability
is not limited to inherent structural defects or faulty appurtenant appliances
and equipment, but encompasses responsibility for an unseaworthy condition
caused by defective equipment brought aboard, used and controlled ex-
clusively by longshoremen in loading and unloading a vessel.6
The Second and Sixth Circuits have evidenced their displeasure with
the results produced by these cases and have attempted to limit their ap-
plication. In two cases 7 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied recovery
on the ground that the injury was not caused by equipment which was
traditionally a part of the ship's appurtenant appliances and equipment.
The court expressed its opinion that the rationale of the Petterson and
Rogers cases had been that the resulting injury was caused by defective
equipment traditionally used in loading and unloading a ship. The Second
Circuit adopted a different interpretation of those cases in its decision
in Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co.8 The distinction turned on the fact
that the injuries in Petterson and Rogers had resulted from equipment
owned by the stevedore company and used conjointly with the ship's ap-
pliances. Recovery was not granted in Forkin because the longshoreman's
injury resulted from the use of equipment owned solely by the stevedore
contractor. But the factual distinctions which these two courts stress do
not seem to be viable after consideration of the Supreme Court's instruction
to look to the type of work performed by the longshoreman in order to de-
termine liability.0 If a longshoreman is doing the type of work traditionally
performed by a member of the crew he is entitled to recover under the
theory of unseaworthiness irrespective of the equipment causing the injury.
The Supreme Court's position is that a longshoreman who is performing
the same tasks as a seaman under equally hazardous conditions should be
protected by the doctrine of unseaworthiness to an equal degree. Recently
a longshoreman was permitted to recover under the unseaworthiness doc-
unloading is the work of the ship's service, performed until recent times by members of
the crew." 328 U.S. 85, 96 (1946). Although this has been the traditional language
utilized to explain the extension of the unseaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen, its
historical accurateness has been seriously challenged. See Tetreault, "Seamen, Seaworthi-
ness and the Rights of Harbor Workers," 39 Corn. L.Q. 381 (1954); Shields & Byrne,
"Application of the Unseaworthiness Doctrine to Longshoremen," 111 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1137 (1963).
6 See Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Rogers v. United
States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954).
7 McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 913 (1961); Sherbin v. S. G. Embiricos, Ltd., 200 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La.
1962).
8 323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963).
9 See Pope v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
373 U.S. 206 (1963).
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trine when he was injured due to a defective unloading hopper located on
a pier; 10 another was granted relief for injuries incurred when he slipped
on a pile of beans which had been spilled on the wharf in the process of
unloading a ship."
The shipowner's liability in these cases is totally divorced from any
concept of moral culpability or fault. A philosophy of liability without
fault is contrary to our basic beliefs and is utilized only when pursuing a
paramount public policy. The shipowner's liability in this area is seemingly
predicated on a desire to grant adequate compensation to the longshore-
man.' 2 The Court's adherence to its decisions permitting a longshoreman to
bring a suit under the theory of unseaworthiness indicates that there are
some elements of damage in a personal injury suit which are not fully
compensated or covered by the Act. Under section 908 of the Act,' 3 an in-
jured longshoreman is limited to a maximum recovery of 66 2/3 percent of
the wages that he lost due to the injury which prevented him from con-
tinuing his usual occupation. Certainly the employee is not being placed
in the financial position he would have been had the injury not occurred
when he is permitted to recover only two-thirds of his normal wages. Further-
more, although section 90714 provides that the employer must reimburse
the longshoreman for all medical services and supplies which are necessary,
there is no allowance made for pain and suffering,'; which are important
elements of damage when a personal injury occurs and often constitute a
substantial portion of the pecuniary recovery. In order to insure adequate
compensation for longshoremen, courts have permitted them to recover com-
pensation bestowed by the Act and later hold the shipowner liable for the
unseaworthiness of his vessel in order to recover damages for lost wages and
pain and suffering. The employee is not entitled to a double recovery but must,
under the provisions of section 933 of the Act, reimburse the employer for
any previously received compensation out of the proceeds of the suit
against the third party.' 6 By allowing this overlap of remedies the courts
have indirectly expressed their dissatisfaction with the extent of compensa-
tion that is available to longshoremen under the Act.
10 Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965).
11 Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
12 Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 86; Huff v. Matson Navigation Co.,
338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964). It must be recognized that the longshoreman in perform-
ing the functions of loading and unloading a ship is undertaking tasks traditionally
performed by the ship's crew. These cases have held that while a shipowner may contract
away these functions, the liability for injury while performing these functions may not
be contracted away.
13 33 U.S.C. § 908 (1964), 44 Stat. 1427-30 (1927).
14 33 U.S.C. § 907 (1964), 44 Stat. 1427 (1927).
15 Furthermore, under this act there is no way to inflict punitive damages on the
employer in order to stimulate him to create better working conditions.
16 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964), 44 Stat. 1440-41 (1927). The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir.
1943); American Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. of Illinois V. Beschner, 97 N.Y.S.2d 781
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
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But it is improper to condition the longshoreman's full recovery upon
his bringing suit against a shipowner. Congress gave automatic compensa-
tion to an injured longshoreman under the Act for the very purpose of
alleviating the necessity of a longshoreman bringing suit against his em-
ployer. The reason for removing the need of the longshoreman bringing
suit was recognition of the precarious financial status that surrounds an
injured workman. The workman's disability may suspend his income and the
problem of providing his family with the necessities of existence becomes a
dilemma of great proportions. The employee's pecuniary condition is so
strained that a lengthy and expensive suit against a wealthy opponent as an
avenue of compensation, except where he can sue on a contingent fee basis,
is usually entirely blocked. Clearly, by failing to adequately compensate
the longshoreman under the Act, and thus compelling the bringing of a suit
against a shipowner in order to receive full compensation, Congress de-
feated their express goal of granting compensation without the necessity of
bringing suit.
Employers realized shortly after enactment of the Act that it was
to their advantage to assist their employees in recovering from a shipowner
since employers were entitled to reinbursement, to the extent of their prior
payment to the employee, from the award which the employee received. 1 7
The assistance rendered was in the form of voluntary payments of money.
Aid was given in this form in order to avoid falling within the provisions of
section 933(b) of the Act, which provided that acceptance by the employee
of compensation "under an award in a compensation order filed by the dep-
uty commissioner shall operate as an assignment to the employer" of the
employee's right to recover damages from a third party.18 The statutory
assignment took place only when compensation was accepted under an
award made by the deputy commissioner. The employer wanted to avoid the
statutory assignment, recognizing the possibility that his negligence might
bar his action against the shipowner. 9 This informal procedure enabled the
injured employee to successfully pursue an adequate remedy in a suit against
the shipowner.
The utilization of this inventive device for furthering a suit by a long-
shoreman, however, was halted when the United States Supreme Court al-
lowed a shipowner to prosecute a suit for indemnity against a negligent
stevedore company. 20 Under the indemnity doctrine a shipowner could
prosecute a suit against the employer whose negligence had made the ship-
17 The employer has this right to reimbursement whether the employer has become
the assignee of the employee's right of action against a third party, by paying compen-
sation under an award, or has paid the compensation without an award. See note 16
supra.
Is 33 U.S.C. 907 (1964), 44 Stat. 1440 (1927).
'9 Whether his negligence bars an action against a jointly negligent third party is
highly disputable and the cases are in irresolveable conflict. See 2 Larson, Workmen's
Compensation § 75.23 (2d ed. 1959).
20 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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owner's vessel unseaworthy. The shipowner could recover the full amount
of any judgment which had been rendered against him for the unseaworthi-
ness of his ship and which was in fact due to the employer's negligence. In
reference to the assistance which employers had been rendering to help em-
ployees recover against shipowners, Justice Black, dissenting, suggested that
the majority opinion in Ryan took away all incentive for employers to follow
this course in the future since any recovery by an employee against a ship-
owner would be recouped in an action by the shipowner against the em-
ployer.21
While there is a certain amount of validity in Justice Black's observa-
tion that Ryan would tend to eliminate any contribution of funds by an em-
ployer in order to assist an employee in bringing suit against a shipowner, it
seems that he may have directed his criticism at the wrong object. The
procedure by which the employer gave "quick money" was not provided for
in the Act. To the contrary, section 933 (a) distinctly provides that the em-
ployee should elect between receiving compensation under the Act and filing
suit against a third party. An employer's contributions were not induced by
the altruistic motive of fully compensating the employee. Rather, by giving
the employee this money, the employer could avoid liability for his own negli-
gence and place the burden of paying on the shipowner. The majority in
Ryan realized that the employer was utilizing this device to avoid the re-
sponsibility of paying for his wrong-doing. In order to prohibit the employer
from shifting the burden of payment in this fashion, the Court held that the
shipowner could sue the negligent employer for indemnity and thus impose
liability on the person who was actually responsible for the injury. Perhaps
Justice Black should have criticized the Act because it failed to adequately
compensate the injured longshoreman instead of criticizing the decision
which halted transferring the burden of payment to a nonnegligent party.
Although the Ryan decision resulted in the cessation of the process by
which a negligent employer would assist an employee to recover from a ship-
owner, it seemed that a nonnegligent employer would continue to assist its
employees in recovering. The form of this assistance would be either by giving
the employee money or by prosecuting a suit against the shipowner for the
benefit of the employee, if the cause of action were assigned to the employer.
But one case may limit the employee's recovery in a still larger number of
cases.22 In this case Czaplicki, a harbor worker, was injured when the ship's
steps he was standing on collapsed. He received compensation under an award
by the deputy commissioner. Travelers Insurance Company, the employer's
insurer, paid the award, and Czaplicki's cause of action passed to it by subro-
gation. Despite this statutory assignment the United States Supreme Court
allowed Czaplicki to bring suit on the grounds of unseaworthiness and negli-
gence against the ship's owner, its operators and the contractor who had built
the steps. Permission to bring this suit was predicated on the fact that Travel-
ers had also insured the contractor who made the steps and therefore Travel-
21 Id. at 144.
22 Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercdoud, 351 U..S. 525 (1956).
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ers ultimately would be liable if the court found the steps negligently con-
structed. Travelers would not prosecute the cause of action that was assigned
to it as Travelers would be the one liable for the damages. The Court was of
the opinion that a conflict of interest was present due to the fact that "Czap-
licki's rights of action were held by the party most likely to suffer were the
rights of action to be successfully enforced."23 Therefore it was held that
Czaplicki was not precluded from enforcement of his rights in an action
brought by himself, although there was a previous statutory assignment of
his rights of action.
In response to the Supreme Court's consideration of the harshness of
section 933 of the Act and the injustices which it tended to produce in the
Ryan and Czaplicki cases, Congress amended this section in 1959. The elec-
tion requirement of section 933(a)2 4 was abolished. Section 933(b) 25 was
amended to provide for assignment by operation within six months of the
compensation award. Furthermore, section 933 (e) 26 was changed to provide
that the employer could retain one fifth of the excess recovered over the
amount that the employee would have received as compensation under the Act.
By virtue of this amendment a longshoreman can collect benefits under
the Act for six months, during which time he has the opportunity to decide
whether or not to bring suit against the shipowner. In addition, if he does
decide to sue the shipowner he will continue to receive these payments until
a decision is reached in his suit against the shipowner. This is in contrast
with the situation which existed before this amendment was enacted. Prior to
the amendment, the employee had to decide immediately whether to receive
compensation under the statute; electing to receive compensation would result
in his cause of action against the shipowner being assigned to his employer.
Alternatively, he could elect to sue the shipowner and, as a consequence, have
no income at all until a verdict was reached in his suit against the ship-
owner. Although the position of the longshoreman was improved considerably
by the amendment, in an appreciable number of cases he will still be limited
to less than full recovery. In cases where a serious accident or even death oc-
curs there will be a large number of debts incurred by the victim's family
between the time of the accident and the date when a formal award is made
by the deputy commissioner under the Act. In many circumstances it is
probable that the family will have trouble meeting these expenses, not to
mention the cost of lengthy litigation. The family is double-vexed as they
have only six months in which to bring a suit. Furthermore, an individual
might not bring a suit due to his satisfaction with the compensation afforded
by the statute but later discover more serious injuries. The short six month
statute of limitations will bar recovery against a shipowner for any injury
which manifests itself more than six months after the award is made.
By altering section 933(e) of the Act to enable an employer to receive
23 Id. at 530.
24 33 U.S.C. 933 (1964), 44 Stat. 1440-41 (1927).
25 Id.
26 Id.
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one fifth of the excess recovered against a third party. Congress was attempt-
ing to induce employers to vigorously prosecute a suit for the benefit of their
employees.2 7 The very inclusion of this revision in the statute indicates Con-
gress' anticipation of a significant number of cases where the employee
would still have to rely on his employer bringing a suit. This provision will
probably not have any appreciable effect because few employers will be
tempted to bring a suit to receive twenty percent of the excess when the ship-
owner will have the defense of the stevedore's negligence. In addition, it is not
clear that the protection of the conflict of interest theory, espoused by the
Supreme Court in Czaplicki, is still available to a longshoreman due to the
enactment of these amendments. Congress apparently thought it had al-
leviated the difficulty which the conflict of interest theory was adopted to
remedy by bestowing additional benefits on the employee. The congressional
committee reported as follows:
In the event that an employee does not elect to sue for damages
within 6 months of the compensation award the employer is as-
signed the cause of action . . . . [T]he bill as amended by the
committee provides greater protection to injured workers and cor-
rects defects in existing law. It carefully protects the interests of
all who are involved and balances the equities.28
There has been an acute shortage of cases dealing with the problem of
whether the conflict of interest doctrine will continue to be recognized. In
McClendon v. Charente Steamship Co.,29 the district court ruled that the
amendment to section 933 overruled and replaced the conflict of interest
theory. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the rationale of the district
court and ruled that the application of the conflict of interest doctrine is
still proper.30 The latter approach was also utilized by a district court in
Castro v. United States.3 1 The Supreme Court of the United States has not
yet considered a case of this nature, so even those cases which have raised
the issue may not be controlling in the future.
In addition to the above mentioned difficulties, a great multiplicity of
litigation will result from allowing the shipowner to recover against em-
ployers, on the theory of indemnity, after the employee sues the shipowner
for the unseaworthiness of his ship. This circuitous route of recovery could
be avoided by allowing an employee to proceed directly against his employer.
Of course, the "exclusiveness of liability" clause of the Act 32 would have to
be deleted to permit a suit of this nature. But an amendment of this type
would not have great practical ramifications as we are presently accom-
27 McClendon v. Charente Steamship Co., 348 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 1965).
28 McClendon v. Charente Steamship Co., 227 F. Supp. 256, 258 (S.D. Tex. 1964).
29 Id.
0 See note 27 supra.
31 230 F. Supp. 967 (D.P.R. 1964).
32 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964), 44 Stat. 1426 (1927). In substance this provision states
that the compensation given by this act is the exclusive remedy which an employee or
his family has against his employer.
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plishing a similar result by permitting shipowners to sue negligent employers
in an indemnity action. The United States Supreme Court has refused to
abide strictly by the literal connotation of the language of the "exclusive-
ness of liability" clause. 33 Although the provision states that "The liability
of an employer prescribed in section 904 . . . shall be exclusive and in place
of all other liability of such employer to the employee . . . ,,34 the Court
still granted the longshoreman recovery in a suit against his employer. The
amount of financial expense involved simply in the bringing of a suit against
a shipowner is astronomical compared to the alternative of compensation
under the statute which is practically expenseless. A few examples will illus-
trate this statement.
In Holley v. Mansfred Stansfield,3 5 counsel reported that the plaintiff
recovered 1,597 dollars compared to a total cost of 24,293 dollars incurred
by the shipowner. The shipowner subsequently successfully sued the em-
ployer for indemnity, and thus the employer was liable for the sum of
24,293 dollars. The recovery under the statute would have been approxi-
mately 23,791 dollars-without the burden of litigation. Since the Act pro-
vides that the employer must make up any difference between the amount re-
covered against a third party and the amount procurable under the Act, the
widow still received 23,791 dollars.3 6 This case points out the vast incongrui-
ties which result from the present Act. The employer should have incurred an
expense of 23,791 dollars; due to the fact that he was responsible for the
costs of the circuitous suit against the shipowner, his total expenditures
amounted to 46,487 dollars. On the other hand, the plaintiff brought suit
against the shipowner in order to collect full wages and, after a long and
time consuming litigation, recovered only the amount that was recoverable
under the Act.
In another suit in which damages for the death of a longshoreman were
sought,37 the parties agreed to a settlement of 215,000 dollars. After fees,
costs and a claim in subrogation, the widow and five children received only
141,018 dollars.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that the goal of just compensation for
injury to a longshoreman can be fulfilled most effectively by a rule applied
uniformly, regardless of the incidental circumstances surrounding the acci-
dent. A longshoreman should not be limited to an inadequate remedy due
to his inability to establish the elements of unseaworthiness or because of
a personal financial deficiency. In pursuing the goal of fully compensating an
injured longshoreman an attempt should also be made to alleviate multiple
litigation and to decrease the expenses of litigation with respect to all of the
33 Reed v. The Yoka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963). A longshoreman was allowed to recover
under the doctrine of unseaworthiness from his employer, a stevedore contractor, who had
chartered the ship on which the injury to the longshoreman occurred.
34 See note 32 supra.
35 186 F. Supp. 212 (E-D. Va. 1960).
36 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964), 44 Stat. 1440-41 (1927).
37 Olson Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 622, 625 (Orphan's Ct. 1961).
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parties involved. The legislative attempt to remedy the deficiencies of the Act
by the 1959 amendment was unsuccessful in that it continued to circumvent
the real problem. But there is no logical reason why Congress should be pre-
occupied with enabling the longshoreman to sue a shipowner. The problem
could be entirely abated by increasing the benefits under the Act and thus
affording adequate compensation without the necessity of bringing suit
against a shipowner. If giving full wages and compensating for pain and
suffering without providing opportunity for the other party to defend
himself is deemed unwise, then provisions should be made for the employee
to sue his employer directly. In this manner the practice of relegating
an employee to an action against the shipowner, who in turn sues the
employer, would be discontinued. Therefore, two possibilities exist by which
the goal of adequate compensation can be realized. This aim could be
achieved by a statute granting compensation to a longshoreman and giving
an additional right to bring suit against his employer. Alternatively, if com-
pensation under the present Act is to be the longshoreman's sole source of
recovery the remedy it provides should be increased to a level consistent
with the amount of damage incurred.

